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THREE POLICY PATHS AFTER CITIZENS 
UNITED: A CRITICAL REVIEW ESSAY 
Michael J. Malbin* 
ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 363. HARDCOVER 
$36.95. PAPERBACK $21.95. 
RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL (UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN PRESS 2015), PP. 192. HARDCOVER $75.00. PAPERBACK 
$39.95. 
RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 
(YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 241. HARDCOVER $32.50. 
PAPERBACK $22.00. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission has been an engine for growth in 
more ways than one.1 It is better known for the massive jolt this case and its progeny 
have given to billionaire-funded independent campaign spending. Consider these 
facts. The 2016 federal elections have been the fourth since the Citizens United deci-
sion in January 2010. The pre-election year of 2007 thus was the last “Invisible Pri-
mary” or presidential-candidate-sifting year before the decision. In 2007, every one 
of the $460 million dollars the presidential candidates raised had to come from do-
nors who could give no more than $2,300 each. According to the Campaign Finance 
Institute (CFI), about 87,000 donors gave the $2,300 maximum in 2007, for a total 
of $201 million coming from maxed-out donors.2 By 2015, these numbers were look-
ing quaint. Individuals, corporations, and unions were now free, because of this de-
cision and its aftermath, to make unlimited contributions to independent spending 
political committees (Super PACs) and other organizations, including ones whose 
                                                          
 * Michael J. Malbin is Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany (SUNY). He is also co-founder 
and executive director of the Campaign Finance Institute, a nonpartisan research institute in Washington DC. 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Presidential Candidates’ Small and Large Donors, Table 5: Individual Donors to 2008 Presidential Candidates, Cumulative 
through December 31, 2007, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/presi-
dent/2016/YE/Presidential%20YE_Table5.pdf. 
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sole purpose was to support a single candidate. As a result, $2,300 donors no longer 
looked big. In 2015 alone, seventy-eight of these donors gave one million dollars or 
more to Super PACs supporting a presidential candidate, giving a combined total of 
$184 million.3 In other words, a mere seventy-eight donors in 2015 gave almost as 
much as the 87,000 “maxed-out” donors had given eight years before.4 They ac-
counted for nearly one-fourth of all of the money raised in 2015 by the presidential 
candidates and their Super PACs combined.5 
Less well known is the explosion of scholarship after Citizens United. In just one 
recent sixteen-month period, an online bibliography of money in politics added 225 
new scholarly publications, papers, or books.6 As one of my professors used to say, 
I cannot read as fast as they write. This essay will focus on three of the many new 
books in the field. Robert E. Mutch’s Buying the Vote is a marvelously rich history with 
bleak policy conclusions.7 It argues that the breakdown of an older consensus on 
campaign finance reform leaves little opportunity for corrective action today. Ray-
mond La Raja and Brian Schaffner see the major problem as stemming from the 
premises that undergirded the earlier consensus.8 Rather than combatting corruption 
or pursuing individualistic equality, they would see healthier politics arising from 
stronger political parties with laws that let the parties raise and make unlimited con-
tributions. Finally, Richard Hasen would combat political inequality by moving in the 
opposition direction—with aggregate limits on the amount that any individual could 
give to political campaigns, combined with small donor public financing in the form 
of government-funded vouchers given to every adult U.S. citizen.9 Collectively, these 
books thus can stand as thoughtful exemplars for the strengths and some problems 
with three of the major policy directions moving forward. 
I. MUTCH’S UNBRIDGEABLE GAP 
Robert Mutch’s narrative in Buying the Vote begins in 1884 with an opulent fund-
raising dinner for the Republican presidential nominee, James G. Blaine.10Among 
those attending were Jacob Astor, Levi Morton, Jay Gould, and others whose names 
have become synonymous with the Gilded Age. That the book begins with 1884 is 
                                                          
 3. Sources of Candidates’ and Campaign and Super PAC Dollars in 2015, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, 
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/16-02-18/Sources_of_Presidential_Candidates’_Campaign_Su-
per_PAC_Dollars_in_2015.aspx.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Campaign Finance Institute Announces Update to Online Bibliography of Money in Politics Research, CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
INSTITUTE, http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/16-02-
26/CFI_Announces_Update_to_Online_Bibliography_of_Money_in_Politics_Research.aspx. 
 7. ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014). 
 8. RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION: 
WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL (2015). 
 9. RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016). 
 10. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 12. 
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no accident.11 Since Andrew Jackson’s 1828 election had regularized the spoils sys-
tem, political parties had been financed in large part through kickbacks from those 
who held patronage jobs. Once the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act became law 
in 1883, this source of party money began to dry up. At the same time, however, 
another was becoming increasingly available. Modern business corporations had be-
come a growing force in the U.S. economy since the Civil War. Blaine’s 1884 fund-
raising dinner was a symbol of the parties reaching out to leaders of the country’s 
largest corporations and trusts.12 By 1896, money from individual robber barons gave 
way to systematic assessments of corporations by William McKinley’s campaign man-
ager, Mark Hanna.13 
Two elections later, McKinley’s erstwhile Vice-President, Theodore Roosevelt, 
was running for reelection as President.14 Although known as a Progressive trust-
buster, the contributions his 1904 campaign received from corporations produced 
what Mutch described as the country’s first national-level cycle of scandal and cam-
paign finance reform15. One legislative outcome was the Tillman Act of 1907, which 
prohibited corporate campaign contributions to federal elections.16 “The rise of the 
big corporation posed an entirely new question for the idea of democracy, and the 
Tillman Act answered it by saying that corporations are not citizens and do not have 
the political rights of citizens.”17 Mutch’s conclusion, after reviewing the primary 
source material, is that even though there were disagreements on other matters, con-
servatives joined Progressives in defining citizenship in a manner that did not include 
corporations.18 
The middle third of Mutch’s book covers the years from the 1907 Tillman Act 
to 1972.19 As in the earlier chapters, Mutch skillfully interweaves political economy 
with contributions and campaign finance reform. One important part of that story 
was how party realignment affected the Tillman Act’s evolution. Mutch reports that 
the Tillman Act and its successor, the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, were not well 
enforced. Big business donors, active throughout the period, were giving to both 
major parties in 1928, but became increasingly Republican during the Depression.20 
Labor was becoming more active and more aligned with the Democrats. Meanwhile, 
Southern Democrats in Congress in 1937 began aligning with some frequency in a 
“conservative coalition” with Republicans.21 The conservative coalition passed the 
temporary War Labor Disputes (or Smith-Connally) Act in 1943 over President Roo-
                                                          
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 21. 
 14. Id. at 26-27.  
 15. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 4-5.  
 16. Id. at 50.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 51.  
 19. Id. at 62-138. 
 20. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 100. 
 21. Id. at 8. 
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sevelt’s veto, which included a ban on labor union as well as corporate contribu-
tions.22 During the Republican post-war Congress of 1947-48, the Taft-Harley Act 
(also passed over a presidential veto) replicated the 1943 ban on corporate and labor 
contributions to candidates and parties and expanded it to reach direct expenditures on 
communications to voters.23 This expenditure provision, included again in the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, was found unconstitutional in Citizens 
United.24 
Illegal corporate contributions were once again part of the scandal-reform cycle 
that began with President Richard M. Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign.25 Of course 
there was also much more, including a break-in and cover-up that led to a presidential 
resignation before a House impeachment vote.26 The 1974 campaign finance law fol-
lowed, which was then tested in the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.27 Among other 
things, Buckley held mandatory limitations on candidates’ spending and independent 
expenditures to be unconstitutional.28 It upheld contribution limits, but only in the 
name of restraining corruption or the appearance of corruption and not in the name 
of promoting equality.29 
From this time forward, Mutch says, ideological division replaced what he saw 
as a long time consensus in campaign finance law about corporate citizenship and 
corruption.30 Buckley’s elevation of corruption as the only accepted basis for limits 
produced decades of argument about what might be counted as corruption. The most 
expansive judicial interpretation appeared in Justice Marshall’s Opinion for a 6-3 
Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce31 Marshall’s opinion upheld the State 
of Michigan’s prohibition of corporate expenditures as aiming “at a different type of 
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag-
gregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form . . . .” 
32 As Richard Hasen has noted, this is a form of “corruption” that seems tinged with 
a fair degree of concern about equality.33 
For Mutch, the various opinions in Austin revealed an “unbridgeable ideological 
gulf,” that was not only about the goal of equality.34 The division was also, in part, 
between those who agreed with a “century-old premise that there was a. . . difference 
in kind between corporations and people . . .” and those who saw only a difference 
in degree.35 Citizens United reversed Austin’s majority and minority votes, but along 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 107. 
 23. Id. at 146.  
 24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 385 (2010). 
 25. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 139.  
 26. Id.  
 27. 423 U.S. 387 (1976).  
 28. Id. at 45, 143.  
 29. Id. at 81, 143. 
 30. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 157.  
 31. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
 32. Id. at 659-60.  
 33. HASEN, supra note 9, at 27.  
 34. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 160, 185.  
 35. Id. at 160.  
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exactly the same fault line. It also turned Justice Kennedy’s Austin dissent (narrowly 
defining corruption) into the Citizens United 5-4 Opinion of the Court.36 
If the division between these viewpoints is truly unbridgeable, as Mutch be-
lieves, then what might one do about it? Some suggest a constitutional amendment; 
others put forward legislative remedies.37 Mutch demurs, stepping back from the 
“customary” conclusion that would “follow diagnosis with prescription”.38 
[T]he diagnosis itself precludes such prescriptions by showing them to be legal solu-
tions to a political problem, actions that would work only if backed by the kind of 
political consensus that crumbled decades ago . . . A reformed campaign finance sys-
tem would make for better politics, but we need better politics to get reform . . . .We 
can solve problems by passing laws as long as our political differences occur within a 
sense of national community, of shared purpose. When our differences grow so wide 
as to erode that sense of community, our political problems become fundamental to 
the system itself and are beyond legislative solution.39  
This gloomy prognosis parallels much of what recent surveys tell us about cam-
paign finance reform: a bipartisan majority does not like what exists but sees little 
prospect for meaningful change.40 But does Mutch’s prognosis follow directly from 
his own history? He is surely correct that enduring political reform has to be built on 
some kind of consensus – at least about recognizing a problem. Nevertheless, one 
must wonder how deep that consensus was in the past. It is true that no one in 1907 
would have portrayed corporations as having the same First Amendment rights as 
natural citizens. As a result, the issue did not come up in that way. Yet it was also true 
during these same years that disputes over the relationship between corporations and 
the state were central to the country’s political divisions. Even within the nearly unan-
imous Congress that passed the Tillman Act in 1907, the consensus on the vote did 
not extend to the reasons.41 Moreover, the bill passed with a not unfamiliar dose of 
heavy skepticism. “Everyone knew the ban against corporate contributions would be 
very difficult to enforce, so hard-headed political realists could see voting for it as a 
largely symbolic measure that would let them resume the old ways in peace.”42 The 
veto override battles during the 1940s over the Smith Connally and Taft Hartley Acts 
were also expressions of political division, not consensus.43 And again, the new laws 
co-existed with practices that subverted their purpose. So even though it is correct to 
                                                          
 36. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010).  
 37. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 198. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Polls Show Americans Favor an Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/poll-shows-americans-favor-overhaul-of-
campaign-financing.html. 
 41. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864. 
 42. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 59. 
 43. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401-531(1947)); 
Smith Connally Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). 
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say that no significant part of pre-1970s campaign finance discourse treated corpora-
tions as natural persons, this silence was coupled with a lack of enforcement against 
corporate contributions made secretly. The apparent dissolution of a public legal con-
sensus coincided with having a law (FECA) whose restrictions against secret behavior 
had teeth and were enforced.44 
Given these historical facts, therefore, perhaps one need not feel quite so re-
signed as Mutch does. Of course, he is right to say it is hard to pass major laws in a 
separation of powers system without some consensus that action is needed. But the 
consensus need not be about the same action pursued by all actors for the same rea-
son. Because of that, worthwhile change may not be quite as difficult as Mutch sug-
gests. We turn now to two different paths that such changes might take. 
II. POLITICAL PARTIES 
For Raymond La Raja and Brian Schaffner, the major issue is not a loss of 
consensus.45 There may be enough agreement for some kind of change, but the ques-
tion is to what end? As these authors see it, the problem is not the lack of common 
opinions about corruption and equality, but with the ways in which reformers have 
tried to pursue these goals by regulating money in politics. They argue that “the in-
tense focus of campaign finance policy on preventing corruption” has been a serious 
blunder based on an “overly romanticized view that democracy is . . . about having a 
direct and equal voice in public affairs.”46 In taking this approach, they fit squarely 
among such important non-libertarian campaign finance reform skeptics as Bruce 
Cain, Nathan Persily, Richard Pildes , and Jonathan Rauch .47  
All of these writers emphasize that democracies in a large republic do not work 
through individualistic citizen engagement. Intermediary organizations are necessary 
to give individuals an effective voice. But intermediary organizations, or interest 
groups, are typically concerned with only slices of the policy agenda. To win elections 
or govern, one needs majority coalitions among factions with different interests. De-
parting from La Raja and Schaffner for a moment, this is the basic argument for a 
large republic in James Madison’s Federalist No. 10: tyrannies can best be avoided by 
                                                          
 44. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
 45. LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8. 
 46. Id. at 3. 
 47. Bruce Cain, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY (2015); Nathaniel 
Persily, Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA, 123-35 
(Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); Jonathan Rauch, POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS, MACHINES, BIG MONEY, AND 
BACK-ROOM DEALS CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2015); Richard Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, 
Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804-852 (2014); For critiques of this self-
described “realist” school of thought, see Thomas E. Mann & E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Futility of Nostalgia and the Romanti-
cism of the New Political Realists: Why praising the 19th-Century Political Machine won’t Solve the 21st Century’s Problems, 
BROOKINGS (June 17, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-futility-of-nostalgia-and-the-romanticism-
of-the-new-political-realists/; Lee Drutman, How to Properly Diagnose the Chaos of American Politics, VOX: POLYARCHY 
(June 24, 2016), http://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/6/24/12020198/rauch-politics-chaos; Lee Drutman, Giving 
the Two Parties Even More Money Will Not Solve Polarization, VOX (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.vox.com/poly-
archy/2015/11/20/9763292/parties-polarization-small-donors; Thomas E. Mann & Anthony J. Corrado, Party Po-
larization and Campaign Finance, BROOKINGS (July 15, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/party-polariza-
tion-and-campaign-finance/. 
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requiring a multiplicity of factions to bargain to form majorities.48 Madison and most 
of the other Framers anticipated that those majorities would be formed through a 
process of deliberative compromise, one bill at a time. At the outset, the Framers 
were opposed to political parties forming coalitions across the policy spectrum. But 
within a short time, as John Aldrich points out, most politicians of the founding gen-
eration came to feel that they needed durable and broad coalitions to achieve their 
electoral and policy goals.49 This was the origin of the first American party system in 
the 1790s. For Aldrich and many other political scientists, including La Raja and 
Schaffner, parties have since proven essential to representative self-government. 
Because parties are essential, La Raja and Schaffner argue, the laws regulating 
money in politics should be (but have not been) sensitive to their effects on these key 
institutions.50 It would be better, they say, if the parties could receive and give unlim-
ited contributions.51 The candidates could then rely on their parties, while the party 
organizations – in their need to build majority coalitions – could filter and temper the 
demands of their donors. Because party professionals are more interested in winning 
than in making ideological statements, they will favor moderate candidates over pur-
ists, thus helping the political system as the parties pursue their own ends. The current 
laws, they say, channel money directly from donors to candidates, encouraging the 
candidates to depend on patrons who are more extreme than the average citizen and 
fostering polarization within Congress.52 This happens because donors, and the fac-
tional candidates they support, often are more wedded to specific issue positions than 
to winning an election. These problems date back to the FECA and McCain-
Feingold, they say, but Citizens United has fueled the imbalance by letting donors give 
unlimited amounts to factional organizations while retaining the limits on parties.53 
Some of these claims (as well as opposing counter-claims) will be familiar to 
those who have been immersed in party debates these past two decades, but these 
authors try to back their claims with empirical research. Statements about the effects 
of campaign finance laws often suffer from a single-minded focus on federal elec-
tions. The problem is that with only one jurisdiction and one set of laws in effect at 
any one time, it can be impossible to decide whether a change in law has been wholly 
or partially responsible for (as opposed to being merely coincident with) a change in 
the larger political system. One way to get around the problem is to compare states 
to each other. With fifty jurisdictions to analyze instead of one, comparisons and 
causal analyses can begin to get serious. 
La Raja and Schaffner prepared a dataset of laws governing contributions going 
into the state political party committees, as well as the ones governing contributions 
                                                          
 48. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 49. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND LOOK (2011). 
 50. LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8, passim. 
 51. Id. at 137.  
 52. Id. at 135.  
 53. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972);; McCain-Feingold Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); LARAJA & SCHAFFNER, 
supra note 8, at 144-47. 
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out from the party committees to candidates.54 Their data covered 1990-2010 – the 
twenty years before Citizens United. In the main comparative empirical chapter, the 
authors described a state as having a “party friendly” system if the law put no limits 
both on contributions going into and coming out of the parties, but they ran separate 
tests on states that had limits in either direction or both, and separate tests for states 
that had professionalized state legislatures as well as for all legislatures.55 Their ques-
tions were whether states with no limits on party money would be associated with (1) 
more moderate state legislators and (2) less polarized legislatures.56 The units of anal-
ysis for both questions in the main section of interest for this review were the ideol-
ogy scores calculated by political scientists Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty for every 
state legislator who served during the time period covered.57 
With respect to the moderation of legislators, their results were mixed.58 The 
authors found Democrats in states with no party limits to be more moderate than 
those in states with limits, but there was no difference for Republican legislators.59 
The authors then retested the twenty most professional legislatures and said that this 
time the difference between states with and without limits held up more strongly.60 
However, as I interpret the presentation of results, it looks from the graphs as if the 
Republicans from states with limits continued to be more moderate than the Repub-
licans from unlimited states. What is going on is not that the two parties are each less 
extreme, but that the distance between the two parties is less in the unlimited states 
and the result is entirely due to the Democrats. Since the legal difference is associated 
with moderation for only one party even though the law applies equally to both, it is 
hard to see how the law can be the engine behind the results. 
With respect to polarization, or distance between the parties (which is different 
from extremism), the results again seem to be inconclusive. The authors find that 
limits on contributions from individuals to candidates were associated with greater 
polarization, but political party contribution limits had no such effect.61 Both of these 
findings were contrary to expectations. However, when the analysis was restricted to 
the twenty most professional legislatures, the result was directly opposite: individual 
contribution limits had no effect but party contribution limits did.62 These results are 
paradoxical. Like the previous mixed findings on the moderation of legislators, the 
facts call for an explanation. Unfortunately, the reader does not get one. Instead the 
authors use the mixed and somewhat contradictory findings as a foundation for their 
key policy recommendation: that all party contribution limits should be repealed.63 
                                                          
 54. LARAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 93. 
 55. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); LARAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 46, at 79.  
 56. LARAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 87. 
 57. Id. at 99; Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
530-51 (2011). 
 58. LA RAJA & SHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 103-05.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. LA RAJA & SHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 107. 
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To some extent the problems with the results may turn on methodology and 
data, although these are not my main concerns.64 My main concern is better explained 
through a thought experiment. Let us assume all of La Raja’s and Schaffner’s findings 
are correct. Assume there is some apparent relationship–albeit paradoxical and in-
consistent– between political party contribution limits and either extremism or po-
larization.65 The recommendation they draw from these findings is to remove all party 
contribution limits.66 But if the limits do any good at all, would not one want to know 
something more before throwing them away? Specifically, given the nature of the 
findings, would not one want to know how to connect the dots between the harmful 
alleged effects (immoderation and polarization) and imputed cause (contribution lim-
its)? For unlimited contributions to affect who gets elected, parties with unlimited 
contributions should be using the money to influence who runs under their labels. 
Of course, we know that strong party leaders can do a great deal to influence who 
runs for and wins their nominations, but the specific effects of unlimited contribu-
tions can only work through the parties’ direct raising and spending of money. 
As it happens, there is a natural quasi-experiment at the federal level to test the 
imputed connection. La Raja’s and Schaffner’s state data run only through 2010.67 
Since then, the Citizens United and SpeechNow decisions have let Super PACs raise un-
limited contributions.68 It turns out that some of the largest Super PACs are all but 
arms of the congressional party leaders, run by their former staff and political advi-
sors. These quasi-party organizations, like their formal party counterparts, were 
among the biggest spenders in closely contested general election races, but they have 
spent practically nothing in contested primaries.69 By their behavior, modern party 
leaders repeatedly have shown that contribution limits are not all that important in 
deciding whether or how they will get involved in a competitive primary. But if they 
do not spend their unlimited money in primaries–if they are saving their money for 
November–then there is no persuasive way to connect the presence or absence of 
contribution limits to the political coloration of those who wear the parties’ labels in 
                                                          
 64. Lee Drutman has written thoughtful and detailed critiques on the book’s data and methodology, the authors 
have replied, and the debate has gone on. I recommend both sides to all interested readers. See Lee Drutman, Giving 
the Two Parties Even More Money Will Not Solve Polarization, VOX (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.vox.com/poly-
archy/2015/11/20/9763292/parties-polarization-small-donors; Lee Drutman, The Debate Over State Polarization and 
Campaign Finance Laws Continues, BROOKINGS (July 16, 2015), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/07/16/the-debate-over-state-polarization-and-campaign-finance-laws-continues/; Ray 
La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Unlimited Party Fundraising and Spending Gives You Less Polarized Legislatures? Discuss, WASH. 
POST: MONKEY CAGE BLOG (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/07/08/unlimited-party-fundraising-and-spending-gives-you-less-polarized-legislatures-discuss/; Lee 
Drutman, Can Unlimited Contributions to Political Parties Really Reduce Polarization?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE BLOG 
(June 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/23/can-unlimited-contribu-
tions-to-political-parties-really-reduce-polarization/.  
 65. LA RAJA & SHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 4-6.  
 66. Id. at 59.  
 67. Id. at 56. 
 68. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 312, 314 (2010); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied sub nom. Keating v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 526 U.S. 1003 
(2010). 
 69. See Robert Boatright et. al., Independent Expenditures in Congressional Primaries after Citizen United: Implications for 
Interest Groups, Incumbents, and Political Parties, 5 INT. GROUPS AND ADVOC. 119, 126, 134 (2016). 
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the general election campaign. The benefits La Raja and Schaffner expect from re-
moving contribution limits have not been established. 
On the other side are the potential risks. And yes, these are about corruption 
or the appearance of corruption. I live in a state in which the Democratic Speaker of 
the Assembly and the Republican Senate Majority Leader have been convicted re-
cently for abusing the power of their offices. Perhaps more relevant are the deposi-
tions filed in the case of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, in which members of 
Congress testified about party leaders shaping the legislative agenda to avoid offend-
ing unlimited soft money campaign contributors.70 So there are plenty of examples 
in the historical and contemporary record to support that there is a risk, combined 
with insufficient evidence to support the supposed benefit.71 
I want to be clear about this critique. It is not an anti-party screed. I agree with 
La Raja and Schaffner about the importance of parties.72 I also agree with most of 
the recommendations in a recent Brennan Center report about strengthening the par-
ties.73 Among other things, these include recommendations to bolster the parties 
through small donor matching funds or tax credits, and to relieve state and local par-
ties of burdensome regulations in federal law.74 My complaint is not with parties as 
such, but with the removal of contribution limits. It may be correct to say that parties 
help overcome one of the defects that come from relying solely on pluralism by mak-
ing it easier to form durable coalitions that can enforce bargains across multiple bills 
and over time. Because of that, it is important to make sure that parties can have the 
resources to operate well in a political world with Super PACs that do not have the 
same interest in broad coalition-building. Even so, this does not mean one should 
scrap contribution limits. There are good contemporary as well as historical reasons 
to avoid taking this path again. 
Besides the corruption concern, we ought also to acknowledge a flip side to the 
issue–something that gets lost by relying solely on pluralism. We can agree with La 
Raja and Schaffner (and more fundamentally with James Madison) that encouraging 
multiplicity in a pluralist system helps temper the dangers of factionalism by forcing 
compromise.75 However, this part of the Constitutional design was mostly about 
helping the system avoid a bad outcome. It does not by itself create the positive goods 
that the Founders sought from a democratic republic. There are shortfalls within 
pluralism that pluralism itself cannot remedy. One is that bargaining within a pluralist 
                                                          
 70. See 145 CONG. REC. S13229-S13234 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999); 147 CONG. REC. S2433-S2455 (daily ed. Mar. 
19, 2001); Michael J. Malbin, McCutcheon Could Lead to No Limits for Political Parties-With What Implications For Parties and 
Interest Groups?, 89 N.Y.U. LAW REV. 92, 95-96 (2014); see also Declaration of Senator David Boren at 3, McConnell 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-0582); Declaration of John Glenn at 1-2, Id.; Declaration of 
Senator Jon McCain at 3-4, Id.; Declaration of Paul Simon at 3, Id.; Declaration of Senator Warren Rudman at 4, Id. 
These declarations are available by using the search engine at http://campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=89%3Amcconnel-fecdcwrd&catid=29&Itemid=2. 
 71. Malbin, supra note 70, at 97. 
 72. LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 33. 
 73. Ian Vandewalker & Daniel I. Weiner, Stronger Parties, Stronger Democracy: Rethinking Reform, NEW IDEAS FOR A 
NEW DEMOCRACY (Brennan Ctr. For Justice) 2015. 
 74. Id. at 12-13, 16. 
 75. LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 8, at 148.  
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 3, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss3/19
 2017] THREE POLICY PATHS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 547 
system occurs only among those who have the political power to be heard. To the 
extent that participation, access to power, and influence over policy can be purchased 
through wealth, this means an electoral system without limits encourages a form of 
political inequality–what Schlozman and colleagues have described as the “unheav-
enly chorus” of unequal political voice.76 Relying more heavily on mega-donors to 
finance the parties can only exacerbate this issue. The question is whether some coun-
tervailing power could and should be introduced to bolster the voices of those not 
being heard. This is the central concern of our next book. 
III. PLUTOCRACY V. EQUALITY 
Richard Hasen’s Plutocrats United, is both an indictment of the out-sized role of 
wealthy donors in contemporary politics and a proposal for change.77 Hasen is con-
cerned about having an electoral system whose dominant financial supporters remind 
one of the robber barons at the 1884 dinner in Mutch’s book.78 It is clear that for 
Hasen, the problem large donors pose will not be resolved by overturning Citizens 
United.79 All that would do is turn the money, now contributed to Super PACs by 
privately held corporations, into individual contributions from the same corpora-
tions’ owners.80 Neither will the problem be resolved by transferring mega-donors’ 
money from Super PACs to the parties. The problem, for Hasen, is the role of the 
mega-donors per se.81 
We know that having more money does not always assure a candidate will win 
an election. Nevertheless, candidates and office holders behave as if they have to raise 
enough money (however much that might be) to be competitive. This results in candi-
dates spending endless hours dialing for dollars and building up debts of gratitude 
toward those who respond. And while Hasen acknowledges that contributions can-
not be shown to sway final roll call votes in Congress, there are thousands of less 
visible ways in which donors and lobbyists can, and do shape legislative outcomes.82 
He cites much political science research to support the claim that major donors have 
a substantial level of access to and influence over the policy decisions of office hold-
ers, including party leaders.83  
                                                          
 76. KAY SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 277-78 (2012); citing E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN 
PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960). 
 77. HASEN, supra note 9. 
 78. Id. at 46; MUTCH, supra note 7, at 21. 
 79. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); HASEN, supra note 9, at 11. 
 80. HASEN, supra note 9, at 175.  
 81. Id. at 47.  
 82. Id. at 50-56. 
 83. See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA 41-46 (2012); LYNDA POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE 
LEGISLATURES: THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS 131-47 (2012); Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broock-
man, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Offices: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 
545, 555 (2016); Benjamin I. Page et. al., Democracy and the Policy Preference of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 
54 (2013); see also John C. Fortier & Michael J. Malbin, An Agenda for Future Research on Money in Politics in the United 
States, 11 FORUM 455, 466 (2013); Lynda Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on Legislative Policy, 11 FORUM 
339, 343 (2013). 
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However, the Supreme Court (in Citizens United and McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission) refused to accept preferential access or undue influence as constitution-
ally acceptable reasons for limiting campaign contributions.84 For the five-justice ma-
jority, only preventing quid pro quo corruption (or the appearance of quid pro quo cor-
ruption) could justify what they saw as a restraint on free speech.85 Some scholars 
have reacted to the Court by arguing for a broader definition of corruption.86 In con-
trast, Hasen urges scholars and future courts to break free of the corruption frame-
work that has dominated campaign finance conversations since Buckley in 1976.87 He 
argues, contrary to Buckley, that promoting a specific form of equality should also be 
accepted as a constitutionally permissible basis for campaign finance legislation, in-
cluding limits on campaign spending and contributions.88 Any such pursuit should be 
done with greater sensitivity to protecting freedom of speech than is often present in 
campaign finance reform advocacy, but sensitivity does not require inaction. 
With that caveat, Hasen argues for laws that would promote an “equality of 
inputs.”89 The phrase is used to distinguish it from an equality of results, or an equality 
of all forms of political influence. To promote an equality of inputs, Hasen recom-
mends a two-pronged approach. To “level up” the playing field, he would provide 
government-funded vouchers of $100 per voter.90 Voters would then be free to dis-
tribute the vouchers to the candidates, political parties, or outside groups of their 
choice. By themselves, vouchers, public matching funds, or tax credits, should not 
provoke constitutional controversy, although many would oppose leveling up on po-
litical or policy grounds. But the second prong of Hasen’s approach would challenge 
Buckley directly.91 Hasen says he is not “wedded” to the details, but wants to focus 
the reader on the larger structure.92 To quote the proposal in its entirety: 
An individual or entity may contribute, spend from one’s own personal or 
treasury funds, or both, no more than $25,000 in each federal election on 
election-related express advocacy or electioneering communications sup-
porting or opposing candidates for that election. Such limits shall not apply 
to the press, to political committees that solely spend contributions received 
from others, or to money contributed or spent in a voluntary, government-
created public finance program. An individual also cannot contribute and/
or spend more than $500,000 total in all federal election activity in a two 
year cycle.93 
                                                          
 84.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362, 451 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450, 1464 (2014). 
 85. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438. 
 86. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 17 (2011) (on dependency corruption); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, 
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 292-98 (2014) (on the historical understanding of corruption). 
 87. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); HASEN, supra note 9, at 185-89 (2016). 
 88. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54; HASEN, supra note 9, at 11. 
 89. HASEN, supra note 9, at 90.  
 90. Id. at 89.  
 91. Id. at 95.  
 92. Id. at 94. 
 93. Id. 
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Candidates, political parties, and political committees (PACs) could continue to 
spend unlimited amounts of contributed money. However contributions would be 
limited, as would independent expenditures by an individual or from an organiza-
tion’s treasury funds. This is a proposal that Hasen knows would have been rejected 
by the recent five-justice majority, which included the late Justice Antonin Scalia.94 
Even so, Hasen does not think that a constitutional amendment is necessary, or de-
sirable.95 For one thing, it would be difficult to imagine mustering the needed super-
majority for an amendment. More fundamentally, he argues that a constitutional 
amendment cannot work.96 Even after an amendment, the boundary lines between 
what would be considered political speech (regulated), and issue speech (not regu-
lated), would either be so restrictive as to threaten free speech, or so porous as to be 
easily circumvented and useless.97 There is no “sweet spot” that will let one avoid one 
problem or the other. 
As a result, Hasen says, “[t]he fight for campaign reform will be political, not 
legal, in the battle for control over the Court: it likely will take a Democratic president 
nominating progressives who can be confirmed by the Senate.”98 This sentence about 
the primacy of politics, is reminiscent of Mutch’s – but with far different implications. 
For Hasen, politics can provide a way out of what Mutch presents as an endless loop. 
He may well be right on this point. However, the 2016 Presidential election clearly 
has made this path more difficult for now. But whatever the immediate practicalities, 
the argument needs to be addressed. Hasen’s call for a shift in jurisprudence does not 
settle anything about the politics that might produce the new laws that could come 
up to the Court for a test.99 Most of the attempts to make new laws are likely to occur 
on the state and local level, and those laws may not look much like Hasen’s proposal. 
There is more than one way to build from the bottom up to promote equality, and 
there is something to be said for Mutch’s view that cross-partisan majorities are 
needed for change to be durable.100 Despite the national election results, cross-parti-
san support may be closer in many states and localities than Mutch or Hasen seem to 
expect. The New York Times poll quoted earlier found that eighty percent of Republi-
cans thought money had too much influence in elections, seventy-one percent sup-
ported contribution limits and seventy-three percent wanted to limit independent 
spending.101 Among campaign finance reform advocacy organizations, Take Back 
Our Republic (TBOR) is composed of Republicans and run by a Tea Party campaign 
professional. It supports contribution limits, stronger disclosure, and tax credits for 
small donors. Another organization, Issue One, has created a Reformers Caucus that 
as of this writing includes more than fifty Republican former Members of Congress 
                                                          
 94. HASEN, supra note 9, at 95.  
 95. Id. at 168. 
 96. Id.  
 97. HASEN, supra note 9, at 94. 
 98. Id. at 178. 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. MUTCH, supra note 7, at 198-99.  
 101.  Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor an Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N. 
Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/poll-shows-americans-favor-overhaul-
of-campaign-financing.html?_r=0. 
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and Governors. In short, this is an issue arena with more political cross currents 
outside the Washington D.C. Beltway than inside Congress.  
Given this situation, one could easily imagine a variety of policies taking root. 
That would be welcome. With variety comes the possibility of serious policy analysis, 
and with analysis come the opportunity for a more evidence-based approach to mak-
ing decisions. It is one thing to throw broad ideas into the air for discussion. But 
when the opportunity opens for new policy, it is best to be ready with one whose 
details have been well scrutinized. This is the weak spot in Hasen’s book. Given the 
paucity of real world examples to test, the weakness is understandable. Nevertheless, 
it is a concern that demands more attention. 
Consider Hasen’s arguments in favor of statutory limits.102 He says that a con-
stitutional amendment would inevitably be too broad or too narrow.103 But if that is 
correct, as I believe it to be, then might not some statutory limits have the same 
problems, diverting contributions without limiting them? This objection, known as 
the “hydraulic theory,” was named by Issacharoff and Karlan and endorsed by La 
Raja and Schaffner.104 Hasen responds to the theory by referring to a Campaign Fi-
nance Institute study, which showed that public for-profit corporations did not push 
their money back into the system once political party soft money was banned 105 In 
other words, squeezing in one place did not cause the same money to bubble up 
somewhere else. The point was correct when the study appeared in 2006, and even 
today there is little evidence that the large, publicly traded corporations that gave soft 
money to the parties before 2002, have shifted their money toward independent 
spending groups.106 That is because many corporations contributing soft money to 
the parties before 2002 were not at all eager to be doing so. Edward A. Kangas, then 
the chairman of global directors for the large accounting firm of Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, and co-chair of the Committee for Economic Development, wrote in a 
1999 New York Times opinion piece that “[w]hat has been called legalized bribery 
looks like extortion to us.”107 It should not be a surprise that those who felt their 
contributions were extorted did not work hard to find loopholes to evade the new 
limits. 
                                                          
 102. HASEN, supra note 9, at 84-103.  
 103. Id. at 94. 
 104. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L.REV. 1705 (1998) 
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Issacharoff-Karlan-1999-Hydraulics-Of-CF-
Reform.pdf; Ray LaRaja & Brian Schaffner, Unlimited Party Fundraising and Spending Gives You Less Polarized Legislatures? 
Discuss., Opinion, WASH. POST, July 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/07/08/unlimited-party-fundraising-and-spending-gives-you-less-polarized-legislatures-discuss/. 
 105. Stephen R. Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, 
POLITICS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT, 79 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006). 
 106. Robert G. Boatright, Michael J. Malbin, Mark J. Rozell, & Clyde Wilcox, BCRA’s Impact on Interest Groups and 
Advocacy Organizations, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 
43 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003); Timothy Werner, The Sound the Fury and the Nonevent: Business Power and Market Reactions 
to the Citizens United Decision, 39 AM. POL. RES. 118 (2011).  
 107. Edward A. Kangas, Soft Money and Hard Bargains, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, http://www.ny-
times.com/1999/10/22/opinion/soft-money-and-hard-bargains.html. 
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In contrast, the mega-donors who have been participating in recent years are 
more likely to be partisans, or issue-driven or ideologically-driven donors. Rather 
than being like the corporate lobbyists who used part of their companies’ corporate 
government affairs budgets for soft money contributions before McCain-Feingold, 
the current mega-donors typically contribute their personal funds or use money from 
privately held corporations they own and run. They “push” their money into the sys-
tem rather than having it “pulled” out of them by office holders.108 They are in the 
game because they want to be. We can neither assume they will transfer their money 
to party organizations, as La Raja and Schaffner seem to do, nor assume with Hasen 
that the new limits will slow them down. La Raja and Schaffner were right to say that 
new laws will affect intermediary organizations in a way that will be driven by organ-
izational imperatives as much as by partisan electoral politics. Sorting this out will be 
complicated, but vitally important. 
There remain dozens of other empirical questions to ask about Hasen’s pro-
posals. For example, I do not think he makes a strong case for vouchers over small 
donor matching funds. We know about small donor matching funds from watching 
them in action since 2001 in New York City but we will have no parallel information 
about vouchers or their side effects until the first-in-the-country Seattle system goes 
into partial effect in 2017.109 Hasen is also mistaken to suggest that small donors are 
more polarized, or more ideological, than large donors. It is more likely true that small 
donors can be more or less polarized, depending upon the laws and fundraising 
mechanisms that stimulate them.110 Finally, allowing voters to give vouchers or any 
other form of public financing to interest groups, as he would, seems likely to favor 
some organizations over others with consequences that need to be considered care-
fully before adoption.111 
None of the limitations noted in this essay should deter readers from devouring 
all three of these books. They deserve a place in any serious conversation about 
money in politics. They have raised the key issues. Yet one walks away feeling much 
is left unresolved. In particular, any effort to change laws should be preceded by 
much more thorough and more nuanced policy analysis than this field has seen so 
far. It is not enough to rely on sweeping proposals guided by instinct. Sound pro-
posals should be preceded by rigorous analysis on a level of specificity consistent with 
the questions raised here. The curse of unforeseen consequences should teach us the 
importance of doing one’s homework. But just because something is unforeseen does 
                                                          
 108. BOATRIGHT ET AL., supra note 106, at 44; Robert G. Boatright, Michael J. Malbin, & Brendan Galvin, Inde-
pendent Expenditures in Congressional Primaries After Citizens United: Implications for Interest Groups, Incumbents, and Political 
Parties, 5 INT. GROUPS & ADVOC. (2016) http://cfinst.org/pdf/papers/Boatright-Malbin-Glavin_IEs-in-Primaries-
after-CU.pdf. 
 109. Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching 
Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-
Model_ELJ_As-Published_March2012.pdf; Elizabeth Genn, Michael J. Malbin, Sundeep Iyer, & Brendan Glavin, 
Donor Diversity Through Matching Funds. THE BRENNAN CENTER AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE (2012), 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NY/DonorDiversity.pdf.  
 110. Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors: Incentives Economies of Scale, and Effects, 11 FORUM 385, 395-397 (2013). 
 111. Michael J. Malbin, Predicting the Impact of Democracy Vouchers: Analysis and Questions in Light of South Dakota’s 
Successful Initiative, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE (December 2016), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-re-
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not mean it is unforeseeable. We are learning much and the conversation needs to 
continue. As these books have made clear, doing nothing carries its own very serious 
risks.  
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